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Nowhere, except perhaps in the author's *Waterways of Westward Expansion* in the Historic Highways series, will one find so full and satisfactory treatment of the conditions and means of navigation on the Ohio from the eighteenth century to the present, covering the age of the canoe, of the flatboat, of the steamboat, and of the steel barge, and not neglecting the activities of the government since 1825 for the improvement of the river's channel. Particularly interesting is the account of the brig and schooner building in the period 1800-1809, when Ohio valley promoters were for the time bent upon the romantic project of establishing direct commercial intercourse with the West Indies and Europe.

The book is unfortunately subject to the limitations and defects of a hasty and somewhat scrappy narrative. It abounds in lengthy quotations, of which those coming from early writers and first-hand observers are clearly apropos, while the utility of those from Roosevelt, Venable, and other recent authors is at least open to question. There is a tendency at times to state things rather more broadly than the authenticated facts warrant. For example, is it not a little too much to say that "There is no question but that the brave La Salle discovered La Belle Rivière of New France (the Allegheny and Ohio) about 1670" (p. 18)? The probability of the discovery is strong, but after all it is only a probability. And does not the statement that "Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century there was continual fighting between the French on the St. Lawrence and the colonists in New England" (p. 19) convey an erroneous impression?

The work is richly illustrated and for the most part with very desirable effect. But one cannot refrain from expressing regret that the process of "padding" which, we may presume, is more or less inevitable in a book of the kind, should have been carried so far as to obtrude cuts of the Carnegie Institute and the Phipps Conservatory into a really solid description of Pittsburgh a hundred years ago, and of the Louisville waterworks into a chapter on "Where Yankee and Virginian Met."

FREDERIC AUSTIN OGG.

Correspondence of William Pitt when Secretary of State with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commanders in America. Edited under the auspices of The National Society of the Colonial Dames of America by GERTRUDE SELWYN KIMBALL. (New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd. 1906. Two vols., pp. lxix, 445; xxiii, 502.)

It is perhaps singular that a century and a half should have elapsed before the student had access, in convenient form, to the correspondence of the "Great Commoner", the man who at a critical moment became the head and heart of England in arms. And it is almost a matter of reproach to the sterner sex that the editing of documents

of such historical importance would still remain to be done, were it not for the energy and pure patriotism of the ladies of America. Every student of the eighteenth century should therefore feel grateful to Miss Kimball and to the National Society of the Colonial Dames of America for the publication of these two excellent volumes.

The purpose of the collection, as outlined in the introduction—in itself a scholarly piece of work—“is to present in chronological order all that is of historical importance in the correspondence of William Pitt with the colonial governors and naval and military commanders, on the continent of North America and in the West Indies, during those years in which he held the position of secretary of state.” This period covers scarcely four years of the career of the great statesman; but nevertheless within that space of time the political course of Europe was changed, the power of France in North America was crushed forever, and the United States became a possibility. For the people of this continent in particular, these letters are of absorbing interest because they permit one to follow stage by stage the development of the colonial policy of Britain and to trace in a measure the workings of the master mind and guiding hand. But since good judgment has been exercised in the selection of the documents and in the addition of useful notes, one would have wished that the earlier letters which throw light on the personality of Pitt could have been included. The measure of success, however, which will surely attend the present publication may induce Miss Kimball to continue her good work.

Pitt was the greatest orator of his day. The music of his eloquence compelled the admiration even of his critics. He was the man of whom England had need, the one man who, when her fortunes were at the lowest ebb, could restore her prestige with a single stroke and place her amongst the foremost nations of the world. These are facts which we recognize and admit; but still we marvel how it was all accomplished by one man, and a study of the letters before us will still leave one in doubt. Pitt was a skilful tactician. He controlled vast fleets and armies without interfering with them, and harmonized all the forces with which he had to deal by his policy. At the time when he began his administration in December, 1756, politics in England were of a low order; and although war had been officially declared between France and England six months before, no definite plan of campaign had been formulated and indeed the weak-kneed ministry had been averse to war. Pitt, while he maintained a high standard of personal honesty, did not hesitate to make use of men whose character he must have despised, and the compromise he effected in the spring of 1757 can be defended only on the ground that he saw in it a means of serving his country. But England and France had been at war in North America for several years before 1756. The French had possessed themselves by right of conquest of vast stretches of country which they might expect to hold by colonization, but which we know now they never could have so held. Bordering upon these lands for

thousands of miles were the settlements of the British people who came to stay, to make homes and seek more lands where and when they needed them. Alleged aggression and trespass on the one hand and alleged interference on the other soon occasioned collisions and conflicts; local in their character at first, but gradually assuming serious proportions, while each country was preparing for the more serious fray. At last the stronger nation, stronger at sea as well as on land, stronger in her institutions and in her material resources, aroused herself under the influence of Pitt, who decided upon the conquest of Canada and found the men and the means to make it an accomplished fact.

Eighteen days after entering upon his duties, he gave an indication of his policy regarding North America. Writing to Lawrence on December 22, he said: "The Dangers to which North America stands exposed have determined the King to take vigorous and effectual Measures to stop the Progress of the Enemy, and to annoy them, if possible, in their own Possessions. It is therefore the King's Intention to cause a Squadron of Ships of War, together with a considerable Land Force, to proceed shortly to North America, whereof 2,000 Men will be forthwith sent to Halifax; and . . . that you do follow such Directions, as you shall receive from the Earl of Loudoun" (I. 1).

England was far less happy in the choice of her commander-in-chief than France. Loudoun, who had been appointed at the outbreak of the war, was no match for the brilliant and tactful Montcalm. He arrived in Albany two months after he was expected by his chief officers, Webb and Abercromby, and found a condition of affairs similar to those which Montcalm had experienced in Quebec—jealousy between colonials and regulars. Loudoun was a man of indecision, and never seemed able to decide upon any plan of attack, and much valuable time was consequently consumed. In June, 1757, with nearly 12,000 men before Louisbourg, he could not determine whether it were better to attack the place or return home. After spending a whole month in considering, or, as Lord Charles Howe said, "In keeping the courage of His Majesty's soldiers at bay, and in expending the nation's wealth in making sham battles and in planting cabbages", he returned to New York, having covered himself with ridicule and greatly amused the French. Pitt no doubt was disgusted, although he does not appear to have passed any comment on his action. On December 30, 1757, he wrote: "I am with Concern to acquaint Your Lordship, that the King has judged proper, that your Lordship should return to England: And His Majesty [has] been pleased to appoint Major General Abercromby to succeed your Lordship as Commander in Chief of the King's forces in America" (I. 133-134).

It was in Quebec, however, that Pitt expected to strike the blow which would decide the fate of New France; and after the operations of 1758, which had been so satisfactory to England and so disheartening to her rival, he was more determined than ever to humble France, rob her of her colonies, destroy her navy, capture her trade, and

settle the question of national supremacy. He did not see the ultimate result upon the aspirations of the Anglo-Saxon across the sea, which was so pronounced in 1776; but he saw that with the thousands of miles of frontier between the English and the French of America, with immediate contact down the Mississippi valley, there never would be peace until it was made by a decisive victory. The correspondence therefore of the minister with Wolfe, Saunders, Monckton, Murray, and Townshend concerning the expedition to the St. Lawrence, although much of it has been printed before, will be read again in these volumes with interest and profit, as it really forms a condensed history of the siege of Quebec.

Although the letters emanate from widely divergent places and embrace a variety of topics, Pitt seems never for one moment to have lost his grasp of the situation as a whole. At one time we find him instructing a governor as to the course he should pursue in his relations with the people, at another he is administering a rebuke, planning a campaign, or attending to the equipment of a vessel in its smallest detail. This careful attention to the minute details of his department had much to do, no doubt, with his successful administration of affairs so far removed from his personal supervision. For it is often the omission of apparent trifles that is responsible for the failure of great projects. Colbert in earlier days exercised a watchful, almost paternal care over the infant colony of New France, and it might prove a profitable study to institute a comparison between the two men in this respect. The letters may be read with special advantage by those who are taking up the study of the campaigns of 1756-1760, and they are full of interest to the average reader, since they contain much of the thought of the greatest statesman England can claim for three hundred years. The books are well printed and are unusually free from typographical errors, although there are one or two slight topographical slips in the volumes, such as placing Bic off the Saguenay River.

The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, its Policy, and its Achievements. By CHARLES OSCAR PAULLIN, Ph.D. (Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Company. 1906. Pp. 549.)

AFTER reading Dr. Paullin's book carefully I am inclined to think that he has in his preface written the best possible review of his own book. As to criticism, he has so carefully guarded himself, by accurate, scholarly methods of work, against the critics, that those "cut-throat bandits in the path of fame" get little opportunity for attack. It is in fact a masterly little book, well conceived, thoroughly studied, and judiciously written. It is a real contribution to the study of the American Revolution.

As Dr. Paullin says, the book is written from the point of view of the naval administrators, and not from that of the naval officers. It is